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Who has Shown Solidarity With Whom in the EU During the 
COVID-19 Pandemic of 2020? Lessons for Teaching Solidarity to 
Students1 
Stefan Wallaschek (Europa-Universität Flensburg) 
 
Abstract: 
This paper analyses the solidarity relations among European Union (EU) member states in the first phase of the COVID-19 
pandemic of 2020. The pandemic affected European countries differently and also questioned the problem-solving capacity of 
the EU in such an unprecedented crisis. Based on the European solidarity tracker data collected by the European Council for 
Foreign Relations, I reconstruct the solidarity relations between the member states. I demonstrate that the EU receives most of 
the solidarity attention from almost all member states. Moreover, publicly declaring solidarity and showing actions of solidarity 
are closely linked to each other in this time period. Experiencing and observing the pandemic across Europe has crucial 
implications on how solidarity as relation can be taught, included in future curricula, and discussed between teachers and 
students. 
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Introduction 
Why is solidarity so appealing in times of crisis: Is it the 
reference to mutual support between social groups and the 
affirmative use of an imagined ‘we’ which is endangered? Or 
is it the shared struggle of the weak and most vulnerable 
groups for a fairer and more equal society and the recognition 
of power imbalances and unjust social relations that gets 
more attention in hard times? All these aspects – reciprocal 
help, social cohesion, fight against inequalities and injustices, 
questioning modes of domination – relate to solidarity and 
various scholars focus on these and refer to historical and 
present examples (Bayertz, 1999; Featherstone, 2012; 
Scholz, 2008). Times of crisis offer a unique opportunity to 
learn from these events how actors behaved, what beliefs and 
ideas prevailed as well as what went wrong for educational 
purposes. Furthermore, looking at solidarity allows a 
relational perspective on events, actions and actors that offer 
new understandings on social and political issues. 
The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented crisis that 
has had a strong impact on societies across the globe. Hence, 
the call for solidarity also resonated in this crisis and, as 
widely reported, countries in Europe are affected by it to 
different extents. This crisis, however, does not only impact 
national populations and economies, but also endangers the 
stability and prosperity of the whole European integration 
project.  
While it is uncontested that the COVID-19 pandemic is a 
severe crisis, it is less clear how solidarity is linked and 
enacted in times of crisis. In general, it can be stated that 
showing solidarity is a matter of mobilization. People 
demonstrate and show their posters and banners. Protest 
camps must be established in order to occupy a place and 
make visible what previously was unnoticed or hidden. The 
same applies to actions that support others by collecting and 
distributing money or goods. Moreover, public declarations 
to act in solidarity also aim to mobilize people, but at the 
same time, legitimize current actions, because they were 
grounded in solidarity (Koos, 2019; Wallaschek et al., 2020). 
No demonstration, protest camp, recurring help or public 
debates on solidarity last forever. Hence, it is crucial to 
understand how patterns of discursive solidarity 
mobilizations relate to actions of solidarity in times of crisis. 
Hence, my central questions are who shows solidarity with 
whom and what is the relationship between discursive and 
actional solidarity during the pandemic? 
I try to answer these questions by looking empirically at 
the COVID19-pandemic in the European Union (EU) and 
how solidarity is shown in the EU and among its member 
states between March and September 2020. Based on data 
provided by the think tank European Council for Foreign 
Relations (ECFR), I reconstruct the solidarity relations 
between the EU member states in the first phase of the 
pandemic. 
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I will proceed in the following steps: I briefly embed the 
text in the growing body of solidarity research before I 
describe the data and present results from the empirical 
analysis. Afterwards, I reflect on the consequences of the 
results for educational purposes and discuss further 
implications of the analysis. 
Research on solidarity has not only quantitatively 
increased, but also produced a variety of solidarity 
conceptualizations. Based on the recent suggestion by 
Wallaschek (2020a), we can distinguish between structure-
oriented, agency-oriented and discourse-oriented solidarity 
research. The first one refers to institutions, structures and 
mechanism that ‘produce’ solidarity. The second approach 
locates solidarity in certain actions, behaviour and attitudes 
by individuals and social groups. The third and final 
approach suggests looking at communicative manifestations 
and discursive constructions of solidarity (see also 
Wallaschek, 2020b). 
Previous studies have used one of the aforementioned 
approaches to examine solidarity in times of crisis but rarely 
brought these approaches together (Baute et al., 2019; 
Lahusen, 2020; Thijssen & Verheyen, 2020). In an 
explorative fashion, the present study uses the data from the 
ECFR to compare the documented actions of solidarity with 
the publicly declared solidarity claims and thereby brings 
together the agency-oriented and discourse-oriented 
approach to solidarity. By doing so, I investigate on the one 
hand whether the same countries who claim solidarity with 
others also take related solidarity actions and on the other 
hand analyse the solidarity relationship between the givers 
and receivers of solidarity. Hence, to what extent do we 
observe reciprocal behaviour between countries who show 
solidarity and countries receiving solidarity (discursively or 
actional)? And can regional differences be detected that 
reveal that EU member states in the same territorial region 
support each other while showing less solidarity to other EU 
member states? 
The European Solidarity Tracker 
The ECFR collected data between March and September 
2020 on solidarity actions in the EU (Busse et al., 2020). By 
looking at multiple media sources, official government press 
releases and other communication channels, they noted who 
acted with whom in solidarity. The team of the ECFR 
differentiated between two main types of solidarity: 
solidarity declarations and solidarity actions. The first one 
fits into the discursive construction of solidarity approach by 
referring to public claims that political actors made to show 
solidarity with others. The second type refers to various 
actions such as economic support, medical aid or 
transnational support schemes organized by local initiatives 
or social groups for others in need. These forms of solidarity 
fit into the agency-oriented solidarity approach. The ECFR 
team also noted who declared solidarity with whom, what 
kind of solidarity is mentioned on which date and collected 
the data for all EU member states. Based on this 
comprehensive data set, I apply a social network analysis that 
treats countries (the EU as polity and the EU27) as nodes in 
the network and the types of solidarity as edges between 
nodes. In total, the network includes 29 nodes and 283 edges. 
The data set also contains the two types of solidarity 
(discursive and actional solidarity), notes who is the sender 
and who is the receiver of solidarity, and based on the 
EuroVoc (n.d.) classification, EU member states are sorted 
into four different European regions (Northern, Central and 
Eastern, Southern, Western). References to the EU in general 
as well as to the EU if the actions or claims refer to the EU27 
are also noted. Furthermore, solidarity is conceptualized as a 
directed relation, because one actor gives solidarity and the 
other receives solidarity. These two directions are analysed 
in terms of in- and out-degree centrality (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2011). In-degree centrality means the number of ties 
a node receives from another node (namely receiving 
solidarity) whilst out-degree centrality means the number of 
ties a node sends to another node (namely showing 
solidarity). By doing so, it is possible to look specifically who 
shows solidarity with whom during the first phase of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in the EU. 
Results 
In the following, I proceed in two steps. First, I present an 
overview of solidarity relations by comparing the networks 
in terms of in-degree and out-degree centrality. Second, I 
differentiate between the two types of solidarity and show 
them in two separate networks. Hence, we can compare who 
shows solidarity with whom and what kind of solidarity is 
demonstrated. This provides a nuanced understanding of the 
actors of solidarity and how different types of solidarity 
converge or diverge during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Figure 1 focuses on the relationship of giving and 
receiving solidarity during the first phase of the pandemic. 
On the left, we see that Germany and France show solidarity 
with a variety of different countries.2 For instance, Germany 
provides masks and other medical supply to Italy and Austria 
in March while the French government repeatedly declares 
solidarity with Italy. Both countries also show solidarity with 
other EU member states such as Romania and Croatia (i.e. 
providing masks and medical equipment) as well as 
supporting EU-wide actions such as the establishment of the 
EU recovery fund. Otherwise, the graph shows that Northern 
countries (Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia) as well as 
Central and Eastern European countries (Slovakia, Hungary, 
Romania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia) give solidarity 
to other countries in their respective regions. While France 
and Germany are clearly politically the most influential 
member states and the economic powerhouses in the EU, the 
regional solidarity relations point towards a certain degree of 
geographical proximity towards neighbouring countries 
(which is also to some extent reflected in the various links 
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Figure 1: Solidarity network among EU member states (in-degree and out-degree centrality)
between France and Germany). Whilst the EU is not a central 
actor in showing solidarity – obviously – the level of the 
EU27 as well as the EU in general receives a lot of solidarity 
attention. The majority of the member states show solidarity 
on the European level in one way or another by giving money 
to EU-wide funding schemes, contributing to economic 
recovery packages, participating in European vaccination 
coordination strategies and publicly declaring solidarity with 
other member states or the EU. Hence, the EU is a crucial 
receiver of solidarity from its member states. Subsequently, 
Italy and Spain as the countries who were hit the hardest by 
the COVID-19 virus also received many offers of solidary 
from multiple sites, followed by Luxembourg, Croatia and 
France. In contrast, Belgium, although having a high share of 
COVID-19 cases among the population received less 
attention from member states.3 Accordingly, we identify a 
parallel attention to solidary with respect to the European 
level as well as support for neighbouring countries. 
In the second step, we turn to the two types of solidarity 
– discursive and actional solidarity. Whilst the former 
networks did not separate them, Figure 2 shows two 
networks: the left network displays the public solidarity 
claims, and the right network shows the action solidarity 
relations during the first phase of the pandemic (March to 
September 2020). I want to highlight two crucial findings. 
First, the EU – as a group of member states (EU27) as well 
as a polity community (EU_polity) is the main addressee of 
solidarity discursively as well as in actional terms. Despite 
the different solidarity types, this is a shared characteristic in 
both networks. It underlines that public claims and actions 
towards solidarity do not strongly differ although the  
discursive solidarity towards the EU was used more (in total) 
than actions towards the EU.so4 Second, the regional 
solidarity patterns differ between the two networks. With 
regard to discursive solidarity, a Southern (Cyprus, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Italy) and a Northern (Finland, Estonia, 
Sweden, Latvia) cluster can be identified, the actional 
solidarity cluster is only similar for the Northern countries 
(Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania); interestingly 
Denmark is not connected to other Northern European 
countries in both networks. The actional solidarity network 
shows a strong dispersion. For instance, Poland supports 
Slovenia and Hungary, but also Latvia and Italy in the 
pandemic.  
 
Source: ECFR; Note: own illustration; The node size in the left network graph is based on out-degree centrality, the node size in the right network 
graph is based on in-degree centrality. The edge colours are based on the outgoing direction, namely who shows solidarity with whom. 
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Figure 2: Discursive and actional solidarity network among EU member states (in-degree centrality) 
Lessons for teaching solidarity to students 
Which educational lessons can be drawn from the analysis of 
solidarity during the COVID-19 pandemic? First, studying 
times of crisis offers the opportunity to look at potential rapid 
change or surprising stability in turbulent times. Crises could 
be understood as moments in which actors re-think their 
mindset, act in surprising ways (or not) and modes of 
cooperation and conflict are created that might be quite 
different from the ‘business as usual’-mode (Hay, 2006, p. 
67). Having times of crisis as guiding ideas in history or 
politics curricula might help students (and teachers) to 
communicate and exchange views on how societal change 
and political transformations come about and impact 
societies and politics. The daily use of social media by young 
people might be a specific access point to engage with crises. 
Social media brings any crisis on to your mobile phone or 
tablet with a few clicks and ordinary citizens can make a 
statement, reply to others via hashtags and posts and by doing 
so they partially re-produce the crisis narrative itself. This 
could be a good thing, because students can engage with and 
experience crises more directly than they would by learning 
from past crises from which they feel more distanced. It could 
create instances of belonging, relating to others and showing 
empathy. For instance, looking at Instagram posts or sharing 
tweets from strangers who have had COVID-19 and share 
their medical treatment story or retweeting experience 
reports from doctors who work in hospital with many 
COVID-19 cases may start a crucial reflection process for 
students, demonstrating that crises are not necessarily events 
of the past. Otherwise, as Chouliaraki (in this issue) points 
out, sharing, retweeting, or liking social media posts might 
be less a sustainable solidarity action and might rather be a 
form of ‘lifestyle solidarity’. Such posts target more public 
attention and try to convey a certain message or brand on 
social media than aiming for social change or empathy with 
others. However, I would argue that reflecting on how 
students experience crises and solidarity and engage with 
those on social media platforms should be a crucial 
pedagogical task in school and higher education institutions. 
Second, using solidarity as a lens to study political and 
social topics might offer a unique cognitive mindset because 
in order to grasp solidarity, a relational perspective is needed. 
Solidarity – whether discursive or actional – requires a 
relationship and at least two actors who behave as 
counterparts: Actor A shows solidarity with actor B and in a 
potential time-delayed manner, actor B enacts reciprocity 
with actor A. It is crucial to understand that actors are 
embedded in structures and create relations between different 
actors and social groups by either discursively appealing to 
solidarity or by undertaking any kind of solidary practice. 
Acting in solidarity resonates between the actors involved, 
and shapes their actions and how they respond to future 
cooperation (see also Fichtner in this issue). In school or 
higher education learning settings, this could mean that new 
curricula formats for history or politics classes are developed. 
Instead of getting to know historical events, international 
politics and political actors as distinct and separated entities 
that can be learned independently from each other, a 
relational understanding would stress the interconnectivity of 
events and how actors are embedded in webs of relations. 
These relations become even more relevant in times of crisis 
because certain relations become more important than others 
Source: ECFR; Note: own illustration; The node size in the two network graphs is based on in-degree centrality. The edge colours 
are based on the outgoing direction, namely who shows solidarity with whom. 
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or even get disconnected due to civil conflicts, economic 
crises or natural catastrophes. Accordingly, for historical and 
social science issues in education, a relational perspective 
offers the chance to study times of crisis and solidarity in an 
interdependent way. By doing so, students can learn which 
actors mutually supported each other (and which actors did 
not), under which circumstances, based on which interests 
and beliefs and thereby, learn history and current topics 
through the lens of solidarity, namely as modes of 
cooperation and conflict. 
Conclusion 
Solidarity resonates quite strongly in times of crisis because 
it promises to overcome this crisis by actions of mutual 
support and standing together. The pandemic seemed to be a 
paradigmatic case to test the existence of European solidarity 
(Wallaschek & Eigmüller, 2020). This crisis could also be a 
crucial reference scenario in classes and seminars to learn 
more about crises, share experiences and debate different 
types of solidarity among students. 
By using data collected from the ECFR, I illustrated 
solidarity relations that have been created, either by public 
claims or by concrete actions from one country to another. I 
demonstrated that the EU was an important receiver of 
solidarity – in terms of public claims as well as with concrete 
action schemes. The EU acted as a distributive hub to which 
member states turned in order to give money, provide 
medical supplies or technical assistance that could be later 
distributed to several member states. Moreover, declaring 
solidarity with the EU was also an important discursive claim 
in the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Hence, we 
see an overlap of discursive and actional solidarity with 
regard to the EU and to a less extent with regard to solidarity 
relations among the EU member states. The analysis has also 
demonstrated that both types of solidarity are shown to 
member states in the same region, creating for instance 
discursive as well as actional solidarity relations among 
Northern European member states. The congruence of both 
types of solidarity highlights the crucial role that the EU and 
cooperative actions among EU member states can play to 
overcome this long-lasting crisis. The widely shared belief 
that the EU and its member states did not do anything and 
hardly cared about the other countries can be somewhat 
contrasted with these findings.5 
Nonetheless, and as the EU summit in July 2020 vividly 
demonstrated (as well as the previous crises in the EU), 
showing and declaring solidarity in the short-term is just one 
side of the coin. The other is the institutionalization of 
solidarity in order to not only counter the immediate effects 
of the crisis, but also the long-term outcomes and the societal 
and economic impact of the pandemic. Lasting solidarity, 
namely agreeing on structures and mechanisms that countries 
could rely on in future crises may be the biggest fault line in 
the EU. While the EU recovery fund might have been a first 
step towards a more institutionalised solidarity scheme, the 
limited time frame as well as a tightening of the rules and 
conditions through the repeated criticism from several 
member states (such as Austria or Finland) have served to 
weaken the idea of European solidarity among EU member 
states in pandemic times. Accordingly, seeing solidarity as 
being part of the actions and public claims by EU member 
states in the first phase of the COVID-19-pandemic is just a 
first and probably the easier step than the second step of 
establishing a European solidarity structure.6 
To conclude this discussion, and in order to matter and 
resonate in public, the idea of solidarity also rests upon 
educational institutions which can give attention to solidarity 
(conflicts) in curricula and convey ideas of solidarity 
between students and teachers in class (see also Kymlicka in 
this issue). Such educational opportunities can lay the ground 
for citizens to support future European solidarity actions and 
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